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INSURANCE
I. INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION
A. Apparent Authority
Two recent decisions, American Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
v. Reliance Insurance Co.' and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Gould,' raise questions concerning apparent authority in second
permittee situations. The litigation in Gould involved the first
permittee Allen, who had maintained the insured car; his uncle
Bufford, who was the driver of the car at the time of the accident;
and Gould, who had granted the original permission (for use of
the car) to Allen. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Gould's
insurer, instituted a declaratory judgment action and alleged
noncoverage on the basis that Bufford had driven the car without
Gould's permission. The car had been purchased and insured by
Gould, Allen's friend and past business associate.3 However,
Gould had left shortly after the transaction for an extended tour
in Europe, and Allen had continued payments on the car note as
per the agreement between Gould and himself.4 Testimony dur-
ing trial centered on whether Allen's uncle Bufford had assumed
(he had) permission to use the car at the time in question since
Allen lived with his uncle and since the car was in Allen's posses-
sion (rather than in Gould's possession). There was no indication
of restricted use, other than the written statement signed by
Gould and Allen, whereby Allen had agreed to be the sole user
for insurance purposes.5 The jury found South Carolina Insurance
Company (hereinafter Carolina), which was the insurer of Buf-
ford's wife, responsible for coverage.'
On appeal, Carolina questioned the jury's lack of specifica-
tion as to whether the first permittee Allen had the authority to
bind the owner of the car. The jury had determined that the
1. No. 20377 (S.C., filed Mar. 9, 1977).
2. 266 S.C. 521, 224 S.E.2d 715 (1976).
3. Record at 48-50. It was intended that the car be eventually registered in Allen's
name. Id. at 49.
4. Id. at 43-47, 53.
5. The agreement provided: "The car is only to be driven by Mr. Allen, and no one
else, as the insurance will not cover anyone else." Record at 32 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No.
7). See 266 S.C. at 529, 224 S.E.2d at 718.
6. Record at 227-28; 266 S.C. at 525-26, 224 S.E.2d at 716. Bufford was insured under
his wife's family automobile policy with Carolina.
1
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second permittee Bufford did not have the express or implied
permission of the owner to drive the insured car at the time of the
accident but, however, did have the consent of the first permit-
tee.7 The South Carolina Supreme Court, therefore, concluded
that the first permittee lacked authority to bind the insured car
owner and declared this decision to be "necessarily included" in
the jury's conclusion.' It held the evidence of the written agree-
ment between the owner and the first permittee to be dispositive.5
The issue of apparent authority raised by Carolina presents
a basis for analyzing the court's attention to circumstantial evi-
dence giving rise to implied consent to use another's car, particu-
larly in the suits involving restricted use of the insured car. In the
recent case of American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Reliance
Insurance Co.,10 the supreme court reiterated the general rule in
South Carolina:
It appears well settled that the named insured's mere permis-
sion to another to use the automobile does not of itself authorize
the first permittee to delegate his right of user to a third person
so as to bring that third person within the coverage of the omni-
bus clause. It is equally well established, however, that the
named insured's grant of authority to the original permittee to
delegate to others need not be expressed, but may be implied
from the broad scope of the initial permission or from the at-
tending circumstances and the conduct of the parties, and a
factual determination must be made in each case to determine
whether the scope of the initial grant was broad enough to in-
clude an implied authority to delegate to another and thus ren-
dered the latter an additional insured."
In Gould, several factors tend to support an appearance of au-
thority of the first permittee Allen to bind Liberty's insured. The
fact that Allen and Bufford, the second permittee, resided in the
same household and were related by marriage probably fostered
the jury's belief that Allen had in fact given Bufford permission
7. Record at 224 (Order).
8. 266 S.C. at 529, 224 S.E.2d at 718. The gist of the supreme court's reasoning was
that if the first permittee had had the authority to bind the insured car owner, then the
jury would have found that implied consent flowed from the insured to the second permit-
tee, particularly since the jury had decided that the first permittee had granted permission
to use the car to the second permittee.
9. See note 5 and accompanying text supra, and text accompanying note 22 infra.
10. No. 20377 (S.C., filed Mar. 9, 1977).
11. Id. at 11-21.
1977]
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to use the car at the time of the accident. 2 Bufford testified that
he had believed Allen to be the owner of the car through a busi-
ness arrangement with Gould, the named insured. :3 Such an as-
sumption presents the question of Allen's apparent authority as
an agent or a personal representative of Gould, within the mean-
ing of section 56-9-81011 of the South Carolina Code and the South
Carolina permissive use decisions.
Although the supreme court in a line of South Carolina per-
missive use decisions has used language indicating that the
course of conduct between the parties will determine the out-
come, the court has continuously held that no omnibus clause
coverage extends to the second permittee when the insured's re-
striction as to use is shown to have existed. For example, State
Farm v. Allstate Insurance Co. ' 5 expressed the rule based on sec-
tion 56-9-810 that "[c]onsent must run to the 'person who uses,'
as well as to the use he makes.""6 The court in State Farm
denied coverage where the insured had emphatically prohibited
anyone other than his son and specifically the youth who had
driven the car at the time of the accident from operating the
insured car. The case differs from Gould in that the owner of the
car, the father, and the first permittee, his son, lived in the same
household and, therefore, the second permittee would have had
more reason to know who actually owned the car and what re-
strictions had been placed on the car.
Decided on the same date as State Farm, Drearbury v. New
Hampshire Insurance Co.'7 presented a similar fact situation. The
12. Record at 75-76.
13. A: [Sihe [Gould] bought the car for him and it was his car.
Q: And it was his car?
A: Right.
Id. at 110.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-810 (1976) provides in part that:
(2) The term "insured" means the named insured and, while resident of the
same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either,
while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses with the consent,
expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the
policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy applies or
the personal representative of any of the above.
15. 255 S.C. 392, 179 S.E.2d 203 (1971).
16. Id. at 396, 179 S.E.2d at 205.
17. 255 S.C. 398, 179 S.E.2d 206 (1971) (both cases decided on February 3, 1971).
Without a jury trial, the lower court in Drearbury had declared that "'It is the
permission to use and not the permission to operate which is controlling.' "Id. at 401, 179
S.E.2d at 207 (quoting lower court order). The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed:
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daughter of the insured lived at home and had possession of the
insured's car as a permittee, not as an owner. The court found
that the insured had expressly prohibited use of the insured car
by anyone other than his daughter; 8 therefore, unless the omni-
bus clause extended broader coverage than that in State Farm,
coverage to the second permittee would be denied. 9 Finding the
omnibus clauses to be essentially the same, coverage was denied.
Dissenting Justice Lewis declared, "This situation is not to be
likened to one where an employed minor pays for an automobile
and takes title in his parent's name for reasons of convenience."'"
While purchased by the named insured, the car insured by Lib-
erty in Gould nevertheless remained in the sole possession of the
first permittee, who maintained a residence separate from that of
the named insured. In addition, it was the first permittee, not the
purchaser, who made the monthly payments on the car note.
More compelling was the belief by the second permittee that his
nephew, the first permittee, was the owner of the car. Since the
daughter in Drearbury had allowed a friend to operate the insured
car, it is not inconceivable that the friend realized the restrictions
placed on the use of the car. The insured had directed his prohibi-
tion to include any person of an unidentifiable class who might
drive the automobile; contraspectively, in Gould the agreement
made at the time of purchase of the car was based on Gould's
assumption that the insurance would not cover anyone else.2'
In Keeler v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"2 the supreme court re-
lied on the major cases of Drearbury, State Farm, and Southern
Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident and
18. Id. at 400 & n.*, 179 S.E.2d at 206 & n.1.
19. Id. at 401, 179 S.E.2d at 207. The omnibus clause in Drearbury was identical to
the clause in the Liberty policy issued to the insured car owner in Gould. Both clauses
provided coverage for "(1) the named insured and (2) any other person using such automo-
bile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is
not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission." Id.;
Gould, 266 S.C. at 528, 224 S.E.2d at 718. The supreme court had commented on the
omnibus clause in Drearbury as being as broad as the South Carolina statute, but "its
obvious purpose is to provide a shield against the so-called liberal view adopted by some
courts in construing omnibus coverage, holding that permission to use an automobile for
one purpose implies permission to use it for all purposes . . . ." 255 S.C. at 401, 179
S.E.2d at 207.
20. Id. at 404, 179 S.E.2d at 208 (Lewis, J., dissenting). As perceived by Justice Lewis
in his dissent, the question should have been whether the use to which the auto was being
put was within the scope of the original permission, not whether the driver had permission
to drive. Id. at 405, 179 S.E.2d at 208-09.
21. See notes 5 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
22. 261 S.C. 151, 198 S.E.2d 793 (1973).
1977]
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Indemnity Co." in deciding not to extend coverage to a second
permittee, when the user had warned against third party use of
the vehicle. The fact situation contemplated by Justice Lewis in
his dissent in State Farm had occurred; the first permittee had
purchased the car, but due to his minority, had been required to
title and insure the auto in his father's name.24 The facts in Keeler
and Gould diverge at this point; in Gould, the first permittee
garaged the vehicle at his residence separate from that of the
named insured. Further, the second permittee was a household
member at the residence, as well as a relative, of the first permit-
tee. Also absent in Gould, as contrasted to Keeler, was the pres-
ence of car use restrictions specifically listing certain named per-
sons. Upon learning about a prior occasion when the son had
allowed a friend to drive, the named insured in Keeler had specif-
ically instructed that this particular friend was not to drive the
car at any future time. It was unnecessary for the court to focus
on the authority of the son to lend the car; the strict prohibition
of this friend's use had compelled a prophesied rejection by the
supreme court of any implied or express consent flowing from the
father to the second permittee without a determination as to
whether the second permittee had relied on the son's apparent
authority to lend the car.
Justice Brailsford, although concurring in result, noted that
the terminology in the State Farm and Drearbury omnibus
clauses was different from the language in the Keeler Allstate
policy and, thus, concluded that those decisions were not to be
controlling.1 Justice Lewis, in dissent, agreed with Justice Brails-
23. 255 S.C. 427, 179 S.E.2d 454 (1971). In Southern Farm, the first permittee had
occupied the insured car while the second permittee had driven. The South Carolina
Supreme Court emphasized that "Consent must flow from the insured or from one author-
ized to act in his behalf." Id. at 433, 179 S.E.2d at 457.
There seemed to be no necessity for determining who had the authority to lend the
car, for the first permittee and the second permittee were well acquainted with the fact
that the insured had purchased the car only for his son's use. Authority to bind the insured
obviously did not rest with the insured's daughter. More important, the court had discov-
ered proof of an express instruction against third party use. Language in the omnibus
clause was identical to that contained in the insured's policy issued by Liberty in Gould.
See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
24. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
25. 261 S.C. at 157, 198 S.E.2d at 796. The Allstate omnibus clause provided coverage
for the following persons:
(1) the named insured with respect to the owned or a nonowned automobile;
(2) any resident of the named insured's household with respect to the owned
automobile; (3) any other person with respect to the owned automobile, pro-
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ford on the terminology point, and discussed an additional rea-
son; the holding in State Farm had been confined to its facts and,
thus, decisions resting on it were similarly limited "so as to render
them of no binding authority" in Keeler.2"
Having rejected precedent as inapposite to the new insurance
terminology in Keeler, Justice Lewis must have recalled the su-
preme court's conclusion in State Farm: "We intimate no view
as what the outcome might be in other cases involving a second
permittee where the record reveals a materially different course
of conduct by the parties involved." Since the course of conduct
in Keeler was not significantly different from that in prior cases
concerning teenaged drivers and their parents' specific instruc-
tions, Justice Lewis turned to the policy to fashion what he con-
sidered to be an equitable and supported interpretation. Examin-
ing the clause, he discovered it to be more liberal than required
by state statute.
The present policy extends coverage to any person where the
actual use of the vehicle is with the permission of the named
insured. There is no condition that the person using the vehicle
must have such insured's consent. Actual use means the use to
which the vehicle is being put at the time by the third party;
and the fact that the named insured may have instructed his son
not to allow a third person to drive the vehicle is irrelevant, since
such prohibition refers to the operation of the vehicle and not
the purpose for which the use is permitted.28
This use-operation dichotomy has been rejected by the South
Carolina Supreme Court as an invalid construction. 29 Similarly,
the court has tended to ignore the issue of authority to lend,
except to equate it with the connotation of implied consent. The
court has, instead, focused on the scope of the original permis-
sion. Thus, in American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Reliance
Insurance Co.3 0 the concepts of authority and implied consent
were expressed contemporaneously and circumstantial evidence
was declared to be the key in determining the scope of implied
Id. at 154, 198 S.E.2d at 795.
26. Id. at 160, 198 S.E.2d at 798 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
27. 255 S.C. at 398, 179 S.E.2d at 205.
28. 261 S.C. at 161-62, 198 S.E.2d at 798 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
29. See 255 S.C. at 395-97, 179 S.E.2d at 204-05; notes 18 & 19 and accompanying
text supra.
30. No. 20377 (S.C., filed Mar. 9, 1977).
1977]
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consent.u' The facts in American Mutual suggest those hypothes-
ized by Justice Lewis in State Farm .3 The insured car in
American Mutual was titled and insured in the name of the father
who had purchased the car for his son, who lived with him. The
supreme court also determined that there was general and unre-
stricted use of the car given to the son. Justice Littlejohn quoted
from the New Jersey decision Baesler v. Globe Indemnity Co. 33 in
extending coverage to the second permittee in American Mutual.
Baesler recognized that the courts are split on whether au-
thority to delegate permission will be assumed from the fact that
the permittee has general custody of the car, where the car had
been purchased by the insured for the exclusive use of another,
as a minor.34 In a four-three decision the New Jersey Supreme
Court denied omnibus clause coverage to the second permittee,
where the named insured had given his nephew, a resident of his
household, exclusive use of the car, and the nephew, in violation
of his uncle's instructions, permitted a friend to use the car. How-
ever, the court noted, "The public interest might be better served
if comprehensive liability policies were written to cover every
driver of an insured automobile, without regard to intra-familial
instructions given by laymen unfamiliar with insurance law.
'35
Chief Justice Weintraub, who wrote the dissent, decried the tech-
nical and unrealistic interpretations propounded by insurers. He
urged that the "ultimate question should be whether under the
circumstances the named insured wanted to deny policy protec-
tion." Further, Chief Justice Weintraub stressed that the facts
and common sense in each case should determine the result; in
this case there was exclusive use of the car granted to the nephew.
31.
Implied authority or permission by the named insured, if established, is as
effective to extend the coverage of the omnibus clause as that which is formally
conferred.
.. . We [have] noted the important role of circumstantial evidence in
establishing implied consent in situations .... where direct evidence, for ob-
vious reasons, is seldom available.
Id. at 12.
32. See notes 21 & 25 and accompanying test supra.
33. 33 N.J. 148, 162 A.2d 854 (1960).
34. Accord, G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANc. 2d § 45:430 (1964). However, strict atten-
tion must be given to the peculiar facts in each situation in order to ascertain whether
valid authority and/or consent was present at the time the second permittee operated
the insured car. Id. at §§ 45:409 and 45:423 (1964 & Supp. 1976).
35. 33 N.J. at 155, 162 A.2d at 858.
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"It could be found that he [the uncle] thereby clothed the
nephew with the appearance of authority to engage in so ordinary
a transaction as a loan of the car to a friend," particularly in the
face of secret instructions. 7 American Mutual reaffirms the es-
tablished rule in South Carolina that in the absence of express
prohibition and of express consent, circumstantial evidence will
determine the extent of original permission and the second permi-
tee's coverage.", American Mutual involved no express restriction
as to use of the insured car. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's attention to Baesler is curious, inasmuch as that case
belongs to the genre of second permittee cases concerning express
prohibitions. Since Baesler was a four-three decision, the South
Carolina court's reference to Baesler could be characterized as a
tolerant recognition of the difficulties concerning omnibus clause
coverage of the second permittee in the parent-owner and
teenager-driver situation.
B. Ambiguity
Finding no ambiguity on the face of the insurance literature
in Yarborough v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,3" the South
Carolina Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine of contra
proferentem.'0 The action involved a group life and medical insur-
ance policy under which the plaintiff-employee was insured. The
plaintiff did not claim that an ambiguity appeared on the face of
the master policy itself, but rather that there existed an ambiqu-
ity on the certificate sent as a substitution and condensation of
the insurance contract." The certificate quoted relevant portions
of the policy, but clearly specified that it was not the contract.
Appended to the front of the certificate was a sticker which had
37. Id. at 159, 162 A.2d at 860 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting).
38. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
39. 266 S.C. 584, 225 S.E.2d 344 (1976).
40. This well-known rule specifies that in the context of insurance policy ambiguity,
where there exist two reasonable interpretations, the final reading will be construed
against its maker, the insurer. See generally 43 AM. Jua. 2d Insurance § 257 (1969) and
cases collected therein. South Carolina has, heretofore, followed this procedure by liber-
ally finding an ambiguity. See, e.g., Walker v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 191 S.C. 187, 4
S.E.2d 248 (1939); Prosser v. Carolina Mut. Benefit Corp., 179 S.C. 138, 183 S.E. 710
(1935); Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 158 S.C. 394, 155 S.E. 617 (1930);
Jennings v. Clover Leaf Life & Cas. Co., 146 S.C. 41, 143 S.E. 668 (1928).
41. As is typical with group insurance policies, the master policy had been kept by
the employer, whereas a certificate, explaining the policy, had been delivered to each
insured. 266 S.C. at 586, 225 S.E.2d at 345.
1977]
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caused the insured's confusion.12
Reversing the lower court's decision favoring the insured, the
supreme court held that the lower court had erred in not looking
only to the four corners of the instrument. Although the supreme
court, per Justice Littlejohn, recognized that "'for the purposes
of construction . . the master policy and the certificate are to
be considered together as parts of the same contract,' ,,13 it
maintained that the sticker and the certificate would only be
considered if the policy itself were ambiguous. The court decided
that the lower tribunal's error originated in its treatment of the
sticker and the certificate as riders to and as parts of the policy
itself. Referring to the language in the certificate and to section
37-14611 of the South Carolina Code, the court ruled that the
certificate and sticker were not in fact parts of the insurance
policy.
The court further declared that there was no ambiguity on
the face of the sticker, even if it were to be considered a part of
the contract; the court ruled that ambiguity may not be created
by examining only a part of the contract; rather, the contract
must be viewed as a whole to determine if an ambiguity exists.
Thus, the court adopted a reading it considered to be reasonable,
consistent with the entire instrument, and based on the intent of
the parties. 5 Despite the fact that the plaintiff had incurred total
costs amounting to $3,177, the supreme court ruled in favor of the
42. The referee whose findings were adopted by the lower court spelled out the ambi-
guity created. The language on the front of the certificate quoted a deductible amount of
$100, The only other reference to a deductible feature in the same vicinity was included
under the provision PERCENTAGE OF COVERED EXPENSES PAYABLE, but simply
stated "80% OF THE FIRST $2000 IN A CALENDAR YEAR OVER THE DEDUCTIBLE
AMOUNT AND 100% OF THE BALANCE." (emphasis supplied). See Plaintiff's Exhibit
#1, Record following page 26. Record at 27, 32 (Referee's report).
43. 266 S.C. at 591, 225 S.E.2d at 348 (quoting 44 AM. Jun. 2d Insurance § 1870
(1969)).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-146 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-70 (1976)),
although not pertaining to certificates, provides that:
Every insurance company doing a life, health or accident insurance business in
the State shall deliver with each policy of insurance . . . a copy of the applica-
tion made by the insured so that the whole contract shall appear in the applica-
tion and policy of insurance, in default of which no defense shall be allowed to
such policy on account of anything contained in, or omitted from, such applica-
tion.
Other sections in the Code relating to insurance standards evince an intent to provide
regulated and conscionable contracts. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-35-480, 38-35-1210
(1976).
45. 266 S.C. at 593, 225 S.E.2d at 349. The court emphasized this rule with regard to
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insurance company, stating, "[i]t is common knowledge that a
major medical expense insurance policy is designed to take care
of major, as contrasted with minor, hospitalization and medical
expenses."46
Further, the supreme court rejected the trial court's empha-
sis on the particular rule of construction that favors typewritten
print over printed matter47 as "not warranted."48 Although the
plaintiff had allegedly read and had expected the certificate and
sticker to provide the claimed medical benefits, the court re-
garded such an understanding as disregarding the basic princi-
ples of insurance and of this particular contract's coverage.4" The
South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff-
respondent's reliance on the sticker's listed deductible features as
unfortunate, but unreasonable and unintelligent." Such a hold-
ing evidences a clear decision to encourage insureds to read and
to attempt full comprehension of the insurance that they buy."'
46. Id. For the rules of construction in group insurance policies, see generally 44 Am.
JUR. 2d Insurance §§ 1868-1896 (1969). See also §§ 259-279.
47. This rule is stated at 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 267 (1969). The referee for the
lower court had also determined that the typewritten sticker pasted on the front of the
printed certificate and the interior printed portions varied in type size; "the first of which
was typed in bold letters and the latter of which was printed in the ordinary printing" in
the remainder of the certificate. Record at 37.
48. 266 S.C. at 593-94, 225 S.E.2d at 349.
49. "To attach meaning to 'deductible amount $100.00,' without considering the
coverage provided, is somewhat like asking the question, 'What is the answer if one
subtracts 10?'" Id. at 593, 225 S.E.2d at 349.
50. Defendant-appellant alleged the plaintiff was intelligent, literate, and "of consid-
erable maturity and judgment" in the context of her managerial position. Brief for Appel-
lant at 13-14. This argument swings both ways, however, making it all the more questiona-
ble as to whether the woman's interpretation was unreasonable. The referee had ques-
tioned whether the plaintiff should have been deemed to have "such expertise in the
procurement of insurance that she was placed on notice to make such inquiry." Record
at 32 (Referee's order). The referee went on to express doubt whether had she done so the
language employed by the company in stating its deductible features was so clear she
would have been convinced that same superseded the typed portion on the front of the
policy. Id.
51. For results of a readability test suggesting that insurance policies are extremely
difficult to read and to understand, see Freeman, Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual
Life Insurance, 28 S.C.L. REV. 1, 66 at n. 209 (1976) (citing Hearings on the Life Insurance
Industry Before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, at 1540 (1973)). "In light of the readability scores, it should not be surprising that
nearly three out of four respondents to a recent national survey of consumers' attitudes
regarding life insurance reported having difficulty understanding 'the terminology used
in life insurance policies.'" Freeman, Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual Life
Insurance, 28 S.C.L. REv. at 67, n. 209 (quoting INsTrrUTE OF LiF INSURANCE & LIFE
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C. Employment Termination Clause
Another erroneous interpretation of a group life insurance
policy resulted in the suit of Moss v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.
52
The contract permitted discharged employees the usual option
of either receiving the face cash value of their certificates or of
taking the paid-up insurance. When the plaintiff-employees at-
tempted to collect the cash value of their respective claims, the
defendant-insurers refused, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had
"not ceased active work with said employer, but [were] still
employed" 3 by the Independent Publishing Company of Ander-
son. Agreeing with the plaintiffs' charge, General Sessions Judge
Agnew of the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, ruled that the four
corners of the instrument allowed, "through the unequivocal and
unambiguous language of its policy," the determination by the
employer of termination of employment to be conclusive.- Speak-
ing representatively for the plaintiffs, the production manager for
the publishing company testified that the termination had been
effected by official notices authorized by the president and pub-
lisher of the company.
5
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court declared, in
view of the automatic rehiring which had occurred, five minutes
after termination," that the termination on March 1, 1974 had
merely been a temporary layoff. Ignoring the clause delegating
conclusive determination of employment stoppage to the em-
ployer, the supreme court focused on the policy's definition of
cessation of employment, which provided that "'if an employee
is temporarily laid off or is granted a leave of absence . . . em-
INSURANCE MARKETING & RESEARCH ASS'N, LIFE INSURANCE CONSUMERS: NATIONAL SURVEY
OF COST COMPARISON ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCE 12 (1975)).
52. 267 S.C. 370, 228 S.E.2d 108 (1976).
53, Record at 7.
54. Id. at 34-35. Specific clauses in the insurance contract had lent support to the
lower court's decision that the employer enjoyed conclusive responsibility for determining
work cessation. Aetna's policy prescribed that "[tihe determination and findings of
Employer with respect to the fact and time of commencement, duration, and termination
of' employment of any employee, with respect to the fact and time of commencement,
duration, and termination of any lay-off, . . . shall be conclusive and binding upon all
persons for the purposes of this policy." Id. at 34. See Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 8, 50 (1959).
Accord, Cutledge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 473, 186 S.E. 208 (1936); John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Paggageorgu, 107 Ind. App. 327, 24 N.E.2d 428 (1940).
55, Record at 14.
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ployment shall be deemed to continue during such lay-off or ab-
''157sence ... .
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the lower court's judicial recognition of the stock transfer to
Harte-Hank Newspapers by the Anderson Company. The lower
court had given judicial notice to the stock transfer and deter-
mined that it was a sale of business which had effected a termina-
tion of employment. It noted that other jurisdictions had con-
strued employment to cease when a sale of all or a part of a
business to another occurred. 8 The South Carolina Supreme
Court, however, stated that this particular stock transfer was
"not the subject for judicial notice."59
D. House Confinement Clause
In Martin v. Pilot Life Insurance Co.,'" the South Carolina
Supreme Court faced novel terminology in a house confinement
clause requiring the insured to be "necessarily and continuously
confined within the house,"'" before disability insurance pay-
ments would be allowed. The plaintiff Dr. Martin, a general prac-
titioner of medicine, collapsed on June 19, 1971, with a severe
acute pericarditis with hemorrhagic pericardial effusion. Pur-
suant to his insurance policy with the defendant Pilot Life, the
plaintiff had received the maximum nonconfining disability pay-
ments (for two years). After this time, however, the insurer de-
nied coverage and alleged that Dr. Martin was no longer totally
disabled and was not confined to his house within the terms of
the policy. In particular, the insurer sought to prove that Dr.
Martin was able to operate his car, play golf weekly, and accom-
plish personal and business tasks.6 2 In a jury trial, the lower court
determined that the doctor was totally disabled and necessarily
57. 267 S.C. at 373-74, 228 S.E.2d at 110.
58. Record at 36 (quoting Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d at 61). Accord, Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.
v. Garrett, 199 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1946).
59. Id. at 376-77, 228 S.E.2d at 111-12. The supreme court did not rule that the sale
of a business does not per se constitute a termination of employment, but rather based
its criticism on the lack of facts supporting evidence of a sale. As to a basis for the lower
court's judicial notice of the sale, see Record at 27 (Exhibit A).
60. 267 S.C. 388, 228 S.E.2d 550 (1976).
61. Provisions of the insured's policy pertaining to the relevant clauses are set out in
the Record at 7-9. House confinement clauses are discussed in Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1408,
1428 (1953).
62. Record at 9. See the list of the plaintiff's activities in Brief for Appellant at 5.
19771
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw [Vol. 29
and continuously confined to his home."
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that
the plaintiff was clearly totally disabled, but declared the inter-
pretation of "necessarily and continuously confined within the
house" to be more difficult. 4 However, the supreme court recog-
nized that such language would not be applied literally, but
rather, would be viewed in terms of "the character and extent of
the insured's illness."6 The appellant argued, and the supreme
court agreed that the Tyler v. United Insurance Co. of America"6
interpretation of a somewhat similar clause allowed the insured
to leave the house solely for therapeutic reasons or "for such other
necessary purpose. '"6 Futilely, the appellant attempted to draw
a distinction between Dr. Martin's activities conducted for
"primarily business or other personal, as contrasted with thera-
peutic reasons."6 However, testimony including two of the plain-
tiff's attending physicians satisfactorily convinced the supreme
court that Dr. Martin's confinement met the "substantial com-
pliance" test in accordance with prior decisions involving confine-
ment clauses. "
63. Record at 120.
64. 267 S.C. at 391, 228 S.E.2d at 552.
65. Id. at 393, 228 S.E.2d at 553. The court discussed the various house confinement
clauses litigated in Price v. United Ins. Co. of America, 254 S.C. 301, 175 S.E.2d 221
(1970); Tyler v. United Ins. Co. of America, 243 S.C. 114, 132 S.E.2d 269 (1963); Shealy
v. United Ins. Co. of America, 239 S.C. 71, 121 S.E.2d 345 (1961); Peace v. Southern Life
& Trust Co., 171 S.C. 102, 171 S.E. 475 (1933). In Tyler, "continuous confinement within
doors" was met when the insured had been substantially confined to his house. Peace
involved a clause requiring the insured to be "necessarily confined to bed," and the court
sustained recovery since the insured had met substantial compliance, although he was not
bedridden at all times. In Shealy, the court ruled that the insured had complied with the
clause requiring "continuous confinement within doors." The court in Shealy cited with
approval the majority view that literal compliance is not necessary. In Price, the insured
had not been under the regular care of a physician, so the court did not view the case as
controlling.
66. 243 S.C. 114, 132 S.E.2d 269 (1963).
67. 267 S.C. at 393, 228 S.E.2d at 553.
68. Id. at 394, 228 S.E.2d at 553; Brief for Appellant at 4. Appellant had offered
substantial testimony to prove that Dr. Martin was able to participate in activities tend-
ing to depict him as able-bodied and actively independent. In particular, the defendant-
appellant had sought to prove through the testimony of a golf pro at the club where Dr.
Martin played that the doctor was a better than average golfer.
69. 267 S.C. at 393, 228 S.E.2d at 553. See cases at note 65 supra. It is particularly
noteworthy that the supreme court accepted the theory that mental health can be an
overriding factor in determining what therapeutic activities will be prescribed. Dr. J. W.
Schofield testified that the plaintiff had endured depressed episodes. Although neither of
the two doctors testifying had specifically directed the plaintiff to play golf, the record
reveals that this sport was approved for improving the circulation in the plaintiff's leg and
13
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E. Builder's Risk Policy
The term "in process of construction" was construed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court for the first time in Crescent Co.
v. Insurance Co. of North America.70 The plaintiff had secured for
a developmental subdivision a builder's risk policy with a vandal-
ism and malicious mischief endorsement. 7' For two years, con-
struction on the houses concerned in the suit had ceased due to a
moratorium ordered by President Nixon on certain FHA funds.
The plaintiff argued that because of an economic depression the
houses were unmarketable, and that in light of this fact, they had
remained four to six percent from completion. 72 During the two
year period, the houses sustained approximately ten thousand
dollars of damage directly caused by vandalism or malicious mis-
chief. The defendant refused payment, relying on the defense
that the buildings were not in the course of construction and that
the houses had, therefore, been vacant and unoccupied for a pe-
riod beyond that covered by the insurance policy. The circuit
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that
there was no ambiguity on the policy and that the houses were
not in the process of construction as a matter of law.7 3
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with
the lower court's interpretation and stated that the purpose for
the policy coverage was obviously not intended to include houses
left vacant for more than the "normal periods of construction. '7
Consequently, the court held that the absence of a definition for
"process of construction" within the policy did not create an
ambiguity in this particular case and thereby applied a reasona-
bleness standard to the construction of terms.
heart muscles and alleviating neurotic and manic conditions. Record at 76, 79. The plain-
tiff's nurse testified that the plaintiff had become severely depressed and inactive when
he realized that he would no longer be able to practice medicine. Record at 60-61.
70. 266 S.C. 598, 225 S.E.2d 656 (1976).
71. For a copy of the policy issued to the plaintiff, see Record and pages preceding
p. (1).
72. The supreme court found the varying margins of completed construction to be
inconsequential, since the greater part of construction had previously been completed and
left standing for an unusual amount of time. 266 S.C. at 601 n.1, 225 S.E.2d at 658 n.1.
73. Record at 49. The lower court found no issue of fact since construction had been
halted for almost two years. Id.
74. 266 S.C. at 603, 225 S.E.2d at 658. The court did not specify what would be
normal but stated that under the facts in the present controversy, it was clear that "in
process of construction" was not "to run in perpetuity from the time of ground breaking
regardless of the insured's actions postponing completion of the houses." Id.
1977]
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However, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the cause for further consideration on the issue of equi-
table estoppel. 5 The court focused on the fact that the insurer
had apparently obtained constructive knowledge of the building
progress by regular receipt of inspection reports. Further, it was
charged that the insurer had accepted extra premiums for van-
dalism during the two-year dormancy, which implied insurance
for a particular risk.
7
1
The decision seems to indicate that the court need not search
for definitions of terminology when the intent of the parties can
be ascertained through their overt acts and the policy itself. Since
the insured-appellant was unaware of the possible adverse inter-
pretation of his policy, it was not difficult for the court to seek
an equitable remedy in the application of estoppel. The supreme
court's action indicates a future adoption of a reasonable time
allowance for vacancy or unoccupancy of buildings under con-
struction, in the absence of clarifying provisions.
II. INSURANCE PROCEDURE
A. Direct Action Against Insurer
Major v. National Indemnity Co. 71 held that in South Caro-
lina there is no implied or express right afforded a third party to
sue directly a compulsory liability insurer if the claim is based on
negligence. The plaintiff in Major sued a truck driver whose al-
leged negligence caused the plaintiff's injury when the truck col-
lided with the school bus in which the plaintiff was riding. The
truck driver's employer carried liability insurance as required by
South Carolina law. In order to sue directly against the insurer,
the plaintiff-respondent made two arguments. First, the respon-
dent argued that sections 58-23-91078 and 58-23-9201 are for the
benefit of the injured public and, thus, imply a right to sue solely
75. Id. at 605, 225 S.E.2d at 660.
76. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5 and Brief for Appellant at 3-4, 10-11 discuss the
grounds for estoppel.
77. 267 S.C. 517, 229 S.E.2d 849 (1976).
78. SC. CODE ANN. § 58-23-910 (1976) requires liability and property damage insur-
ance or a surety bond to indemnity loss by reason of any act of negligence.
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-920 (1976) provides in part: "The owner or owners of all
motor vehicles transporting goods of any kind for hire on the roads of this State are hereby
required as a condition precedent for using the highways of this State to carry with some
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and directly the compulsory insurer in an action founded on neg-
ligence. 0 Second, the respondent argued that section 15-15-20,11
allowing joinder of the liability insurer, is permissive, not manda-
tory, thus implying consent to bring a direct action. 82 Describing
the issue to be one of "first impression,"" the South Carolina
Supreme Court rejected the respondent's interpretation of the
three statutes.
In the absence of express statutory provisions, the supreme
court referred to common law where there is no right to maintain
suit directly against an insurer when there is no privity of con-
tract.84 However, the court had previously recognized that since
the purpose of compulsory liability insurance is to provide
"indemnity for the liability of the tort-feasor, and not for his loss,
the injured person has, under the statutes and under the contract
of insurance, a beneficial interest in the policy, and is entitled to
sue before or after judgment has been rendered against the in-
sured tort-feasor.
' 's5
Although the supreme court in Major noted that the purpose
of sections 58-23-910 and 58-23-920 was "to insure financial re-
sponsibility of motor vehicle carriers,"8 there is a threshhold dis-
tinction between compulsory liability insurance statutes directed
towards carriers and financial responsibility statutes. The former
type, with respect to common carriers and to transporters, is
80. Brief for Respondent at 5-6.
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-20 (1976) states:
When an indemnity bond or insurance is required by law to be given by a
principal for the performance of a contract or as insurance against personal
injury founded upon tort the principal and his surety, whether on bond or
insurance, may be joined in the same action and their liability shall be joint and
concurrent.
82. See Brief for Respondent at 3-4.
83. 267 S.C. at 519, 229 S.E.2d at 849.
84. Id. at 520, 229 S.E.2d at 850 (citing G. COUCH, 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 45:764
(1964) [hereinafter COUCH ON INSURANCE]). Professor Couch attributed the rationale of
the common law proscription to "the mere fact that the insured was to be indemnified
for damages awarded against him for accidental injuries to a third person." COUCH ON
INSURANCE at § 45:764 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the treatise notes, "[however,
it is now common by statute or by policy provision to give injured persons rights of direct
action against the insurer." Id. at § 45:763. Accord, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713
(Fla. 1969), af'g 211 So. 2d 593 (1968) (holding that public policy recognizes that a direct
cause of action inures to benefit of injured in auto liability cases).
85. Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 463, 25 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1943) (citing
Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931); Piper v. American
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930)).
86. 267 S.C. at 520, 229 S.E.2d at 850.
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usually characterized as a condition precedent to the privilege of
operating on state highways, in the event that the innocent public
should be injured,8" whereas the latter is to ensure the availability
of proceeds to one injured by a careless or financially irresponsible
driver. 1
Early South Carolina decisions dealing with joinder of insur-
ance companies appear to have been based on the rationale that
the right to join compulsory insurers was implicit in the purpose
of this type of statutorily required insurance. 8 Thompson v.
Bass"n had permitted joinder of the compulsory insurer, despite
the policy's prohibition of an action against the carrier's insurer
until after judgment had been resolved against the insured. The
supreme court had liberally construed the purpose of the compul-
sory insurance statute to be remedial and implied a right to join
the insurer, for "[t]he contract of insurance carries with it, the
Statute of the State, makes it a part of it; the Statute says that
it shall be given for the protection of the traveling public .... "I'
The court in Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co.2 ruled that section
8511, the predecessor to section 58-23-910, required common car-
riers to maintain security for tort liability and stated that there
is "no doubt that it was intended to insure the collection by
passengers and public of tort liabilities of the carriers. '9 3 The
court added that the statute did not "dissipate the former clearly
expressed original liability of the insurer for payment of the dam-
ages." 4 Referring to Small v. National Surety Corp.," the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Bryant analogized the carriers' type
of insurance to suits brought upon bonds filed by State Highway
Patrolmen; aggrieved members of the public, as plaintiffs, were
87. Id. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-920 (1976), quoted in part at note 79 supra.
88. COUCH ON INSURANCE at § 45:658.
89. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 254 S.C. 235, 174 S.E.2d 768
(1970) (construing a North Carolina compulsory liability statute); Piedmont Fire Ins. Co.,
Inc. v. Burlington Truckers, Inc., 205 S.C. 489, 32 S.E.2d 755 (1945) (decided subsequent
to passage of what is now § 15-15-20); Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d
489 (1943) (decided subsequent to passage of what is now § 15-15-20); Thompson v. Bass,
167 S.C. 345, 166 S.E. 346 (1932); Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E.
135 (1931); Ott v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 161 S.C. 314, 159 S.E. 635 (1931); Piper
v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
90. 167 S.C. 345, 166 S.E. 346 (1932).
91. Id. at 349, 166 S.E. at 348.
92. 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E.2d 489 (1943).
93. Id. at 460-61, 25 S.E.2d at 491.
94. Id. at 461, 25 S.E.2d at 491.
95. 199 S.C. 392, 19 S.E.2d 658 (1942).
17
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entitled to sue the surety company alone for the alleged torts of
any officers." Describing the basic principles underlying compul-
sory liability insurance, as opposed to private insurance, the
Bryant court said "it is not an indemnity of the carrier from loss
but constitutes an original and direct liability from the insurer to
the damaged passenger or other member of the public. '9 17 The
distinction between compulsory and private insurance had been
recognized in Piper v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co."
"Private so-called liability insurance may be insurance against
loss so that one with a cause of action against the insured has no
original right to proceed against the insurer, the latter's liability
being only to absolve the insured from loss." 9
To justify permitting joinder of the insurer in McIntosh v.
Whieldon,'0 9 the supreme court, dealing with a cargo insurance
policy, declared "it is clear that under its terms a direct obliga-
tion by the insurer to the shipper is created and such endorsement
constitutes an unconditional and absolute promise by the insurer
to pay to the shipper any loss or damage to the cargo for which
the carrier could be held liable . . ... 0 The court in McIntosh
gathered support from the interpretation of a similar cargo insur-
ance policy in Carolina Transportation & Distributing Co. v.
American Alliance Insurance Co.'12 which had held "that such
insurance was for the benefit of the owner of the goods, who may
96. 202 S.C. at 461, 2b S.E.2d at 491.
97. Id. at 462, 25 S.E.2d at 492.
98. 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930). Piper also analyzed the obligations arising out
of the different types of insurance:
"A distinction is made between contracts for indemnity against liability,
and those of indemnity against loss. In the former case the insurer's obligation
becomes fixed when liability attaches to the insured. In the latter case the
insurer's liability does not attach until loss has been suffered, that is, when the
insured has paid the damages."
Id. at 112, 154 S.E. at 108 (quoting 1 JOYCE INSURANCE 2d ed. § 27b). See Brief for
Respondent at 6., Major v. National Indem. Co.
99. 202 S.C. at 462, 25 S.E.2d at 492. Accord, Piper, 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106. Piper
also suggests that an action based on negligence, not on willful conduct, against the
insurer should not be a claim for more than the required policy provides. See Brief for
Respondent at 1, 3-4. For other limitations as to joinder, see Dobson v. American Indem.
Co., 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.E.2d 869 (1955); Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Burlington Truckers,
Inc., 205 S.C. 489, 32 S.E.2d 755 (1945); Holder v. Haynes, 193 S.C. 176, 7 S.E.2d 833
(1940).
100. 205 S.C. 119, 30 S.E.2d 851 (1944).
101. Id. at 126, 30 S.E.2d at 854.
102. 214 N.C. 596, 200 S.E. 411 (1939).
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maintain an action directly against the insurer for any loss suf-
fered."'0
Dealing with the decision of whether to permit joinder of
insurers in actions based on negligence, the early South Carolina
cases encountered the problem of possible prejudice in allowing
jurors knowledge about the party insurer. Several courts easily
disposed of this difficulty by emphasizing that the acts requiring
a common carrier to secure a bond or insurance were deemed to
be public laws and common knowledge to every citizen. 4 "In a
case of this nature it would be practically impossible to keep
knowledge of it from the jury."'' 5
Despite the possible inferences in the early joinder suits that
compulsory liability insurance inures to the benefit of the injured
party, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled such decisions to
be "inapposite" in Major.' It held that there exists no right at
common law and refused to imply from statutory law a right of
direct action solely against the insurer. The supreme court's un-
equivocal reluctance to imply a right of direct action could be
attributed to other reasons, in addition to those listed in the
opinion. One possibility is that no insurance or surety company
would be willing to assume responsibility to others than the
named insured. Another argument is one of concern in any deci-
sion impacting the insurance institution; multiple litigation
could increase the premiums for coverage which could in turn
force the public carriers out of business.' Nevertheless, Major
seems to hinder the public policy supporting the compulsory lia-
bility insurance statutes by placing time consuming procedural
obstacles in the path of the injured party who is merely trying to
realize the fruit of an insurance policy of which the General As-
sembly has declared him the principal beneficiary.
103. 205 S.C. at 126, 30 S.E.2d at 854. Compare surety cases permitting a direct cause
of action against the surety. Small v. National Sur. Corp., 199 S.C. 392, 19 S.E.2d 658
(1942) (and cases cited therein); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Vickers, 138 Ga. 233, 188 S.E.
24 (1936). See also Brief for Respondent at 4.
104. Dobson v. American Indem. Co., 227 S.C. 307, 87 S.E.2d 869 (1955); Benn v.
Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931) (citing Piper v. American Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930)).
105. 162 S.C. at 52, 160 S.E. at 138.
106. 267 S.C. at 519, 229 S.E.2d at 850 & n.1.
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B. "Walkaway Draft"
A "walkaway draft," a procedural device used in insurance
negotiations, presented a novel problem for the South Carolina
Supreme Court this past year in Russell v. Ashe Brick Co. ,1" The
plaintiff had been injured when a pallet of bricks collapsed on
him during the course of his employment. Settlement negotia-
tions between the plaintiff and his employer's insurance com-
pany, Insurance Company of North America, (hereinafter INA)
proved unfruitful, and the insurer had sent a letter with a draft
for $5,500.00 to the injured claimant.' "9 During post-trial motions
the defendant claimed an offset against a $2000 actual and $5000
punitive damages award entered for the plaintiff. The lower court
denied the offset of the amount of this check, and the insurer
appealed.
Advance payments differ from the walkaway draft in that a
release or a receipt, stating that the insurer is entitled to an offset
of the amount in a future verdict, accompanies the advance pay-
ment."0 The advance payment is further distinguishable from the
walkaway draft in that the advance payment contemplates a fu-
ture adverse verdict or settlement whereas the walkaway draft is
the top dollar offer figure that the insurance company is "ever
willing to pay on" the claim."' This procedure has been ac-
claimed by the insurance industry as "the humane thing to do for
someone in distress, but [is admittedly] principally for the pur-
pose of controlling the case thus hoping to avoid litigation and
ultimately disposing of the case by settlement at which time it
108. 267 S.C. 640, 230 S.E.2d 814 (1976).
109. The letter read in part:
We regret we have been unable to mutually agree upon a settlement figure of
your claim. We have again reviewed the settlement value of your claim and we
want you to have now what we believe to be the full value of your claim. We
enclose our draft in the amount of $5,500.00 in settlement of your claim. It is
understood that you have not signed a release and that our payment is not an
admission of liability. The law of this State provides that if you are to institute
a suit for personal injuries it must be within six years of the date of accident. It
is our hope that this payment will bring this matter to an amicable conclusion.
Copy of letter inserted in Record between 44 and 45 (Defendant's Exhibit 1).
110. See Carpenter & Snow, The Legal Aspects of Partial Payments Made on Liabil-
ity Claims in Advance of Final Settlement, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND
COMPENSATION LAw 499 (1967); Gallagher, Advance Payments: A Defense Attorney's View-
point, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 513, 519 (1967);
Robinson & Due, Advance Payments-Problems in Practice and Procedure, INS. COUNSEL
J. 444 (1968); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1091 (1969).
111. Record at 21.
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would be expected that credit be taken for the funds ad-
vanced."',
2
The absence of a receipt of credit or offset has been held not
to be dispositive of whether the insurance company may claim
such credit or offset for an advance payment. Looking to the facts
and circumstances and relative knowledge of the insured has been
determinative of whether the insurer may claim an offset.
"[P]robative evidence of a clear understanding should satisfy
the need for" proving a credit condition."' Ignoring the lack of
receipt or notice of offset, the South Carolina Supreme Court
analogized the walkaway draft to a settlement procedure,"' not-
ing the Harrington v. Edwards"' decision where a liability insurer
had waived the claimant's signature after paying the medical
liability proceeds required by the policy provision. Although lim-
ited to its facts and the policy provisions,"' the Harrington court
had determined that it would be the intent of the parties, as well
as an avoidance of unjust enrichment, to allow an offset against
the verdict. The supreme court reversed the lower court in Russell
and designated the philosophy underlying its action to be in line
with similar cases avoiding unjust enrichment to the claimant."
7
Further, the fact that punitive damages may not have been
contemplated by the parties when the walkaway draft was issued
did not prevent the court from allowing offset against both puni-
tive and actual damages. The respondent contended that in issu-
ing the walkaway draft, punitive damages had not been part of
the negotiations in this case nor were they a customary procedure
used by INA."5 Although the respondent acknowledged that he
112. Brief for Respondent at 10 (quoting The Legal Aspects of Partial Payments
Made on Liability Claims in Advance of Final Settlement, supra note 110). Accord,
Deschamps, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 8 (October 1966); Franklin, Chanin & Mark,
Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961); Graham, Advance Payment and Personal Injury Claims, I
THE FORUM (April 1968); KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965); Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
913 (1962); Univ. of Mich. Law School, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS COSTS AND PAYMENTS
(1964).
113. Gallagher, supra note 110, at 519.
114. 267 S.C. at 643, 230 S.E.2d at 815.
115. 262 S.C. 263, 203 S.E.2d 691 (1974).
116. See 267 S.C. at 644 n.2, 230 S.E.2d at 815 n.2.
117. 267 S.C. at 643-44, 230 S.E.2d at 815. Accord, Boles v. Steel, 288 Ala. 732, 264
So. 2d 191 (1972); Edwards v. Passarelli Bros. Automotive Serv., Inc., 8 Ohio St. 2d 6,
221 N.E.2d 708 (1966); Byrd v. Stuart, 224 Tenn. 46, 450 S.W.2d 11 (1969); 22 AM. JUR.
2d Damages § 206 (1965); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1115 (1967).
118. Brief for Respondent at 7-13. See note 110 supra and Record at 15, 19, 20, 25,
21
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understood the check was "to apply" to his claim, he also stated
that he did not know what punitive damages were, and that no
reference to them had been made during negotiations."
South Carolina has recognized that punitive damages are
inclusive in the obligation undertaken by a liability insurer that
has contracted to pay all sums because of bodily injuries.'2 How-
ever, a tenable agreement presupposes that while the obligation
to pay punitive damages attaches at the time of the contract, the
contemplation of the actual amount arises only after a liability
has been determined, and actual damages have been awarded.''
The supreme court ruled that "[iut is uncontested that appellant
was legally obligated to pay both actual and punitive dam-
ages,"' 2 and thus allowed the walkaway draft to offset both. The
policy reason supporting this decision is evident. The procedure
of issuing money to the plaintiff before final settlement or adjudi-
cation is beneficial to the plaintiff, regardless of any ultimate
reasons by the insurance companies.
C. Conditional Receipt
Vernon v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. 23 in-
volved an action brought by beneficiaries to recover the proceeds
on a life and accident insurance contract procured by the de-
ceased applicant. The jury in the lower court trial had returned
a verdict in favor of the beneficiaries, finding that the insurer
Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company (hereinafter Prov-
ident) had acted in bad faith in rejecting the decedent's applica-
tion. The facts centered around the conditional receipt delivered
to the decedent after he had filed an application with payment
for the first month's premium.'24 The receipt stipulated two con-
29, 30, 32, 37, 38, & 40 for respondent's testimony and Record at 25, 29, 30, 32, 37, & 38
for INA's procedures.
119. Record at 19, 20, & 40.
120. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 326 F. Supp. 931 (D.S.C. 1971);
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); 8 J. APPPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4900 (1948).
121. "In order to sustain a verdict for punitive damages there must be an award for
actual damages." Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. at 204, 139 S.E.2d at 910; State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 326 F. Supp. at 935-36 (quoting Cook v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 183 S.C. 279, 190 S.E. 923 (1937)).
122. 267 S.C. at 644, 230 S.E.2d at 815.
123. 266 S.C. 208, 222 S.E.2d 501 (1976).
124. The supreme court noted the advantages and disadvantages of the effective
times of such receipts. If the application is accepted only after a medical examination and
19771
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ditions precedent to the acceptance of the decedent as an insured
from the date of the application: a medical examination, and the
insurer's acceptance of the applicant as insurable based on "the
Company's rules and standards."'25
South Carolina has followed the rule allowing the insurer to
state that such receipts are "a qualified acceptance; the risk tak-
ing effect only in the event that the application is accepted, and
that the company elects, after examining it, to issue such a policy
as is applied for."' 26 However, the caveat to this rule is that the
decision not to insure and to refuse to issue a policy must be made
in good faith and not "exercised arbitrarily, capriciously and un-
reasonably.""'2 In determining whether coverage was afforded by
the interim receipt in Vernon, the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated that the "[1]iability of the insurer, if any, is dependent
upon the language of the receipt, the facts of the particular case
and the intention of the parties."'
2 8
the company's approval, "[lilt eliminates misunderstandings and law suits." If immedi-
ate credit is given from the moment of the application's delivery, it gives the applicant
security "of immediate insurance coverage"; the advantage to the insurance company in
this case is obligatory loyalty by the insured and a lessened risk that the applicant will
"shop around for other coverage and renege on his contract." Id. at 214, 222 S.E.2d at
504. See also 43 Am. JUR. 2d Insurance §§ 220-225 (1969); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 943 (1948).
125. 266 S.C. at 212, 222 S.E.2d at 503.
126. Hyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 98, 117, 190 S.E. 239, 247 (1937)
(citing Life Ins. Co. v. Young's Adm'r., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 85, 106 (1874)). "To be binding
as a contract of insurance, a preliminary contract must be one for present insurance and
not merely an agreement to insure at some future time, as on acceptance of an application
or on the issuance or delivery of a policy." 32 C.J. § 183 (1923) (footnotes omitted), quoted
in Hyder, 183 S.C. at 119, 190 S.E. at 247.
"When properly executed it [the binding receipt] protects the applicant for
insurance against the contingency of sickness intervening its date and the deliv-
ery of the policy, if the application is accepted. If the latter is not accepted or
refused, in the valid exercise by the company of its rights, the binding slip ceases
eo instanti to have any effect."
Stanton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 137 S.C. 396, 417, 135 S.E.
367, 374 (1926) (quoting Joyce, INSURANCE 2d § 64).
127. Hamrick v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 252 S.C. 108, 117, 165 S.E.2d 567,
571 (1969); 29 Am. JUR. Insurance § 210 (1960). See Stanton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y
of the United States, 137 S.C. at 422-23, 135 S.E. at 375.
128. 266 S.C. at 214, 222 S.E.2d at 503. In Hyder, the supreme court found there was
a binding receipt, since the application had been approved by the district office, pending
a medical examination, before the home office had accepted or rejected the application.
In Stanton, the divided court had discovered that there was no binding receipt, since the
receipt stated it would be effective from the date of application only upon approval by
the home office. The supreme court found that the application had been, under the
established rules of the insurer, rejected in good faith before the applicant's death. In
Ham rick, the supreme court found there had been a good faith rejection when the condi-
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The applicant in Vernon was killed in an automobile acci-
dent after his medical examination had been conducted but be-
fore his application and premium had reached the insurer's home
office. Provident had rejected the applicant under its second con-
dition precedent after its investigation determined the applicant
to be unacceptable according to the company's allegedly existing
rules. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that Provident
could not deny the existence of a contract, as the testimony re-
vealed that the insurance company had no identifiable rules or
standards of its own by which to refuse the coverage; 19 therefore,
good faith became a jury question. The supreme court approved
the lower court's admission of testimony by an experienced un-
derwriter for another company for determining the acceptability
of the decedent as an insurable risk. Evidence revealed that Prov-
ident had acted in bad faith in refusing to insure the decedent
from the date of his application. 3 ' The court focused on the inad-
equacy of Provident's investigation and found that extrinsic evi-




129. "This gave to Provident a flexibility of decision in each case." 266 S.C. at 217,
222 S.E.2d at 505. The assistant vice president of Provident's Life Department had testi-
fied that manuals from other companies were used not to govern, but to serve as guidelines
to underwriting. Id. at 216-17, 222 S.E.2d at 505.
130. The company claimed to have rejected the decedent's application on the basis
of some medical reports reflecting complaints of chest pains. The supreme court, however,
chided Provident's investigator for not having diligently sought information from three
doctors "who should have been able to give him more information relative to the dece-
dent's health than any other persons." Id. at 219, 222 S.E.2d at 506. The decedent's use
of nitroglycerine was deemed insignificant by the court, since the medication had been
prescribed not for him, but for his mother.
131. 266 S.C. at 219, 222 S.E.2d at 506.
1977]
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol29/iss1/10
